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F AIRNESS: EFFECT ON TEMPORAR Y AND 
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES IN POSTED-OFFER 
MARKETS* 
Robert Franciosi, Praveen Kujal, Roland Michelitsch, Vernon Smith and Gang Deng 
Questionnaire studies suggest that perceptions of fairness cause people to resist price increases 
following abrupt changes in conditions with no cost justification. This hypothesis is examined in 
posted-offer markets extending previous work. Consistent with the hypothesis, in the profit 
disclosure (fairness) treatment prices are initially below those in the cost and the no disclosure 
treatments. But over time prices in all treatments converge to the competitive surplus maximising 
equilibrium. Thus 'fairness' is interpreted as being the result of expectations that are not 
sustainable. Expectations adapt as the market converges to the standard competitive equilibrium 
prediction. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
I.A. Background 
Survey studies of attitudes toward pricing in retail markets (Kahneman et al. 
1g86a, hereafter KKT; 1g86b) have reported that respondents do not consider 
it fair for a firm to increase prices and profits when there is a short-run change 
in the economic environment that is not justified by a cost increase. For 
example, the following hypothetical circumstances are posed (KKT, p. 201): 
'Questio'n r. A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The 
morning after a large snowstorm the store raises the price to $20. Please rate 
this_ action as: Completely Fair __ Acceptable __ Unfair __ Very Unfair 
__ .' 82% of respondents rate this action as unfair or very unfair. What .is 
fairness? This question is not addressed by KKT. In the light of our data, and 
related literature, we return to the issue of interpreting fairness in Section V. 
Okun ( 1 g8 1, p. 170) had earlier argued that fairness considerations explain 
why firms operate with backlogs in periods ofshortages (e.g. automobiles), and 
why sports tickets are often not priced to clear the market. Okun and others 
have argued that such instances of fair behaviour by firms constitute actions 
which are in their long-run profit maximising interest: the social rules of 
fairness define the terms of an implicit contract that is enforced by virtue of 
punishment ofunfair price behaviour.1 But KKT (p. 201) argue that in many 
• Research support by the National Science Foundation and the Economic Science Laboratory is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Our investigation of the pricing of basketball tickets at the University of Arizona is consistent with a 
rational implicit contract interpretation. Historical holders of season tickets who renew each year ha ve an 
entitlement to continue renewal. They pay S262 per ticket plus a required 'contribution' (tax deductible) 
of S10o to the Wildcat Club. New tickets (not many become available each year through release; a recent 
auction ofentitlements for two tickets brought S13,soo in a bankruptcy settlement) are priced under severa! 
options designed to clear that market. Two of them are: ( 1) bu y each year a loge season ticket for football 
for S 1 ,4oo-S 1 ,8oo and get the right to a basketball ticket for $362 (including the contribution); ( 2) bu y an 
entitlement with a Ss,ooo contribution to the Wildcat Club. Why is the S10o contribution not included in 
the official price of the ticket? Very simply, it gives the athletic department more budget flexibility under 
state spending rules. The athletic department does not price all tickets to clear the market to avoid a feared 
situations people report they would follow fair policies in the absence of 
enforcement through punishment. Thus people report that they would leave 
restaurant tips (about 15 %) even in cities that they did not expect to visit 
again. 2 Respondents also report that they expect automobile repairmen to treat 
tourists and regular customers alike in spite ofthe differing possibilities for long-
term punishment strategies (KKT, pp. 212-3). 
These considerations lead to the proposition that markets in which a firm 
makes pricing decisions that affect customers ( e.g. posted prices in retail 
markets) will fail to clear if excess demand is not justified by increases in 
supplier costs (KKT, p. 213). This is because of the 'principie of dual 
entitlements', under whiéh customers have a right to the terms of a reference 
transaction, while the firm has a right to its reference profit (Zajac, 1985, pp. 
1 39-41). Recent posted prices can serve to define the reference transaction 
(KKT, pp. 201-2). But people do adapt: 'Psychological studies of adaption 
suggest that any stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at 
least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer come to mind. Terms of 
exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of a 
reference transaction ... they adapt their views offairness to the norms of actual 
behaviour.' (KKT, p. 203). These considerations imply that the short-run 
price response to excess demand will be sluggish in markets in which a price 
increase is not justified by an increase in unit supply cost; if the excess demand 
persists, only new higher prices are sustainable, and people will adapt by 
redefining the reference transaction. The equilibrium may still be that which 
is predicted from economic theory. In this paper we assume that the 
hypothesised short-run failure of markets to clear depends upon buyers 
knowing that increased profits would result from the higher prices. In the 
absence of such information, buyers do not ha ve a common reason for resisting 
the actions. 
LB. Question 1 Responses: Market Eifects 
In order to understand the responses to KKT's Question 1 better, we 
conducted two variations on it. First, we noticed two features of their question 
that seemed unusual. lt used the words 'fair' and 'acceptable' within the same 
instrument, precluding the possibility that a situation might be judged unfair 
but nonetheless, acceptable. Also, questionnaires normally allow respondents 
firestorm ofprotest from the legisla tu re, the alumni and the community who bought their tickets years earlier 
in loyal support ofa less popular basketball programme. Many ofthese individuals may feel they ha ve earned 
their implicit entitlement contract, and many contribute additional money to university programmes. 
2 Although tipping in such situations has been described by KKT as due to a 'fairness' ethic, it is 
important to realise that it is based on a widely accepted expectation that tipping is an exchange- a payment 
for service. The IRS considers tips an exchange, and taxes the employer's estima te as income. The powerful 
expectations that drive tipping is clear in the following incident involving one ofus (Smith): Ten people go 
toa Mexican restaurant at the end of a conference da y. No tip was left in the belief that with groups of six 
or more an a u toma tic 15% gratuity was included. The waiter follows the payer into the parking lot and 
demands to know what was wrong with the service? It was fine. But you left no tip. Wasn't a tip included 
in the bill? No. Forthwith he is given $20. U pon reporting this experience in various seminar presentations, 
other such incidents of outraged waiters (blocking the exit door) and taxi drivers (hurling coins ata fieeing 
customer) are brought forward. Ciearly, there is a strong mutual expectation that service requires a reward, 
which is recognised and taxed by the state. This is so whether or not an exchange will be repeated. 
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to register 'no opinion '. Consequently, in our first variation of Question 1, 
everything was the same as in KKT except that we removed the word 'fair', 
asking our respondents to please rate the store's action as: Completely 
Acceptable (29·7 %) Acceptable (32·4 %) No Opinion (5·4 %) Unacceptable 
(2to%) Completely Unacceptable (5·4 %). For N= 37, our results are shown 
in the parentheses. We get 32·4% who rate the action as Unacceptable or 
Completely Unacceptable. We use these results as a subject control for 
introducing a treatment change. Using a different sample ofrespondents from 
the same pool ofundergraduates, our second variation ofQuestion 1 posed the 
same situation, but added the sentence: 'The store does this to prevent a 
stockout for its regular customers since another store has raised its price to $20.' 
Changes in the economic environment have implied consequences in the 
behaviour of markets; our purpose was to express the sort of market 
consequence that might reasonably follow such a change.3 The issue here is 
whether the store's response to market competition could serve to justify its 
action (in addition to KKT's postulate that people will accept a price increase, 
relative toa reference transaction, ifit arises from an excess demand that is cost-
justified). Our results for N= 41 are: Completely Acceptable (34·1 %) 
Acceptable (39·o%) No Opinion (7'3%) Unacceptable (19·5%) Completely 
Unacceptable (o%). With a marketjustification the percentage in the last two 
categories falls from 32·4 to 19'5 %. 
These data suggest the need for reward motivated experiments, in a posted-
offer market setting, to explore further the KKT hypothesis that subjects might 
trade off self-interested behaviour against concerns of fairness. 
I. C. Previous Experiments 
Kachelmeier et al. (1991a, hereafter KLS) report laboratory experiments 
designed to measure the effect of the above fairness considerations on actual 
price responses and convergence behaviour in experimental markets using buyer 
posted bid pricing. In their environment, five buyers and five sellers trade for 
ten periods under stationary value/cost conditions. Buyers independently post 
bid prices, and sellers respond with individual sales by accepting bids. Then a 
change is introduced for a new ten-period sequence. In the first sequence, sellers 
are subject to a 50% profit tax such that, at the competitive equilibrium price 
and volume, the sellers' share of total surplus is exactly 50%. But in the second 
sequence of 1 o trading periods, the sellers' 50% profit taxis replaced by a 20% 
sales tax on each seller's revenue. The effect of this sales tax is to raise the 
previous marginal cost supply schedule, MC(q), to 1'25 MC(q). This increases 
the competitive equilibrium price, lowers the volume, and increases the sellers' 
3 When markets fail to clear at below-equilibrium prices, both buyers and sellers are hurt by the resulting 
stock-out approach to rationing. Sorne buyers, who would be submarginal at the equilibrium, can profitably 
bu y at the disequilibrium price; this displaces intra 11,1arginal buyers for whom purchase is more profitable, 
with consequent losses ofbuyer profit (surplus). In particular, ifwe postula te KKT's local stores, one 'unfair' 
consequence ofnot raising price is that sorne units are sold to crossover buyers who thereby displace sales to 
neighbourhood customers. If the store refuses to sell to strangers (besides being actionable in court), it is 
vulnerable to the charge that this is unfair to anyone who drove out ofher way to bu y at lowest cost. Given 
a change from the reference baseline, all alternative policies are 'unfair' to sorne subset of buyers. 
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share of total profit. Each of three different information treatment conditions 
is replicated three times with different subjects (go subjects total): ( I) seller 
marginal cost information is disclosed to all subjects; (2) the sellers' share of 
aggregate profit (surplus) is disclosed to all subjects; (3) no marginal cost or 
profit information is disclosed. With profit disclosure, buyers are fully informed 
that, compared with the previous ten reference transactions periods, the change 
to a sales tax regime has shifted net surplus from buyers to sellers. With 
marginal cost disclosure, buyers are informed that prices must increase to cover 
the new seller costs. Consequently, profit disclosure focuses on the KKT 
principie that sellers are only entitled to their previous reference profit (it is 
'unfair' for sellers to profit from the tax), while marginal cost disclosure 
reinforces the principie that any price increase is justified by a unit cost 
increase. The treatment with no marginal cost or profit disclosure provides 
experimental control. The prediction hypotheses, based on KKT, are as follows 
(KLS, p. 697). 
H I : The initial price response to a change from an in come to a sales tax will 
be greater under marginal cost disclosure than under profit disclosure. 
Convergence over time relative to baseline control experiments will be 
H2: faster under marginal cost disclosure; 
H3: slower under profit disclosure. 
KLS report statistical support for all three hypotheses.4 Our results below for 
posted-offer pricing are completely consistent with those of KLS, except for 
sorne minor deviations in the efficiency results, which we discuss in Section 111. 
l. D. Extension: Posted Bid versus Posted O.ffer 
The institution used by KLS is posted bid pricing. 'The trading rule allowed 
only buyers to propose prices.' (KLS, p. 7oo). This was defended on the 
grounds of 'intentional experimental artificiality '. That is, sin ce fairness 
directly concerns the perceptions and response of buyers, this device enables 
direct measurement of that response in terms of posted buying prices. 
In this note we pro pose to examine the robustness of the KLS results using 
the familiar retail institution in which sellers post prices to buyers. This 
institution is quite clearly the one that KKT have in mind in their consumer 
market examples (although they do discuss labour markets in which wage bids 
are made by firms). To wit: 'For example, 68 percent ofrespondents said they 
would switch their patronage to a drugstore five minutes further away if the 
one closer to them raised its prices when a competitor was temporarily forced 
to close ... Retailers will ha ve a substantial incentive to behave fairly if a large 
number of customers are prepared ... to avoid doing business with an unfair 
firm' (KKT, p. 212). Thus, customers will withhold demand from an unfair 
firm, and, anticipating this, the firm will have an incentive to price fairly. In 
the experiments reported below, in which sellers independently post prices to 
the buyers, we can study not only buyer demand withholding behaviour, but 
4 In a related study, Kachelmeier et al. ( 1991 b) examine fairness using the double oral auction trading 
rules with a different experimental design and perspective. The basic result, however, a tendency for the 
fairness effect to dissipate over time, is the same. In this paper we use the design reported in KLS (1991 a). 
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also the seHers' indirect attitudes towards 'fairness' as expressed in the prices 
they post to buyers. Of course, if sellers post lower prices under profit disclosure, 
we cannot know whether it is beca use they are being 'fair' or beca use they are 
simply responding rationally to avoid expected punishment by buyers. 
We employ the Novanet (Plato) posted offer mechanism described by 
Ketcham et al. ( 1984), with the modification that in the experiments reported 
below, sellers could not see each other's prices after independently posting them 
in each period. This has the effect ofreducing the ability ofsellers to undercut 
each other's prices; i.e. by this procedure one expects to observe a purer and 
perhaps more persistent individual • fairness' response, thereby giving the KKT 
theory its best shot in the experimental market context. This is not to deny 
that markets may be more competitive when sellers observe each other's prices. 
Rather, our point is that the reported experiments control for this, and, if the 
effect offairness disappears, then under this interpretation we have a stronger 
result. The effect of publicising price information can always be studied using 
the experiments herein as a comparison control. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL D.ESIGN 
Essentially> we use the same experimental designas in KLS, The information 
disdosuretreatments are identical as described above in Section I. Our supply 
and demand environment, also identical with that of KLS, is shown in Fig. I 
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regime in part two. Our design and procedures differed from KLS only .in the 
following respects. 
( r) We used six buyers and six sellers, rather than five each. (This was to 
accommodate a second independent follow-on experiment that required twelve 
subjects.) 
(2) Each of the three treatment conditions, parts one and two, were 
replicated four times instead of three times (144 subjects total). 
(3) Two control experiments were run for twelve price/purchase periods in 
part one; the others for ten periods. Two profit disclosure experiments were run 
for twenty periods in part two; the others for ten periods. The two longer profit 
disclosure experiments allowed us to determine if any equilibrating tendencies 
continued after the first ten periods. 
(4) Between parts one and two oftheir experiments KLS scheduled a break 
allowing buyers and sellers to be separated (ostensibly to pay them privately) 
and given the required separate instructions for the part two, sales tax (no 
disclosure), regime. We did not do this, but elected simply to pass out different 
instruction forms to buyers from those to sellers in the control experiment; since 
everyone received paper, this disguised the different treatment of sellers. The 
instructions to buyers simply informed them that their redemption values in 
part two were the same as in part one, while it was explained to sellers that 
starting in the next period they would paya sales tax rather than a profits tax. 
Table 1 contains a summary of all handouts for the different information 
Table 1 
Handouts for Experiments 
Control Marg. cost 
experiment disclosure* 
B S B S 
1st part of experiment 
How a buyer calculates profit A1 A1 A1 A1 
How a seller calcula tes profi t A2 A2 A2 A2 
Explanation and graph of profit tax 
Form: expected price, actual price, sellers' 
share of profits 
2nd part of experiment 
Notice: nothing changedf Bl 
N o ti ce: new instructions B2 
M C disclosure B3 B3 
Explanation and graph of sales tax . 
Form: expected price, actual price, sellers' 
share of profits 
B, Buyers; S, sellers. 
* Same as control experiment (no disclosure) in 1st part of experiment. 
t Buyers were informed that their values are the same as in part 1. 
Profit 
disclosure 
B S 
A1 A1 
A2 A2 
A3 A3 
4 4 
B4 B4 
4 4 
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treatments which can be compared with the KLS procedures (pp. 691-703, 
715--6).5 Subjects earned non-trivial amounts of money. Payoffs for the 
experiments, which !asted usually between 2 and 2} hours, ranged from $8.75 
to $62.50, averaging about ~)26 ($3, 700 in total). These payoffs substantially 
exceeded our subjects' usual opportunity costs. f'or a survey ofpapers that have 
evaluated the importance ofmonetary rewards, see Smith and Walker (1993). 
HL HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
HL In period one, part two, the first period of trading under the sales tax 
regime, the KKT fairness argument will yield prices ordered as follows: 
Prices {marginal cost disdosure) > Prices (no disdosure) > Prices (profit 
disclosure). 
H2. By period ten, part two, the prices under the various treatment 
conditions will be indistinguishable. 
H3. Under the profit disdosure treatment, the two experiments that 
continue for t\venty periods in part two will show convergence to the 
competitive equilibrium. .· 
The weigh ted mean con tract price (ea eh posted price is weighted by volume) 
for the four experiments in each information condition is shown plotted across 
all periods in both parts of the experiments ín Fig. 2. ln part 2 there is ini tially 
3·3.------------------------------------------------, 
3·2 .. 
3·1 -
3 
GE 
(sa) 2·9 -- , . 
2-8 
2·7 
2·6 
CE 
(pr) 2·5 
2-41 3 5 7 9 u 
' {b) 
3 S 7 9 11 13 15 11 19 
Period 
Fig. <.~. Mean contract price'!: pmfit tax and sales tax. {a) ., prc; +, prm; *, prp; (h) o, s/lt; +, 
sam; ')(:.,sap. Theexperirnenrshave twnstages. With (i) profittax (pr); (ü) saleo! mx (sa). (e), control; 
(m), MC; (p), profit disdosure. 
(period one) a clear separation of mean o bserved prices in accordance with H r. 
Under marginal cost disclosure prices jump immediately to the new 
equilibrium, while under profit disclosure they do not change from their 
previous 'reference transaction' leveL By period 10 the mean price under a.ll 
& All forms and supplemental irutructional bandouts are available by writing to the authors (Sniith). 
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Withholding 
Profit tax 
Sales tax 
Table 2 
Buyer Withholding by Treatment 
Control MC disclosure Profit disclosure 
2 2 
Sum 
5 
27 
* 22 of these cases were in experiment sa4P and involved three buyets. 
three information conditions has converged to near the new compehtlve 
equilibrium price ($2.90). Finally, the two experiments that were extended for 
twenty periods in part two stabilise at slightly above the competitive 
equilibrium price in periods 1 1-20. 
We test H1 and H2 using the nonparametricJonckeere test that the samples 
(mean contract prices), of size mt( = 4), are from an a priori ordering of 
n( = 3) distributions against the null alternative that the samples come 
from the same distribution. The Jonckeere test is a generalisation of the 
one-tailed Wilcoxon test. For H1 we reject the null hypothesis with a te-st 
statistic ] 1 (3,4) = 2'34 (p = o·o1). For H2 we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis, ] 2 (3, 4) = -o·439 (p = o·33). 
In the profit tax regime (part 1, periods 1 to 10-12, Fig. 2), although prices 
in all treatment conditions hover above the competitive equilibrium, prices are 
lowest under profit disclosure. The three series come together, however, by 
period ten. Consequently, even in the baseline series, with no reference 
transaction, initially we observe lower prices under profit disclosure. Profit 
disclosure blunts the profit-seeking behaviour of sellers relative to the other 
experiments. But the effect of profit disclosure is even more striking under the 
sales tax regime, given the previous reference transactions in the baseline. The 
ten.dency of the 'profit disclosure' price path to be below that of the 'marginal 
cost' and 'no disclosure' treatments is evident, but the control and marginal 
cost disclosure price paths are indistinguishable after the first three periods in 
part 2. 
In Table 2 we report the frequency with which demand is withheld 
(underrevealed) by buyers. This frequency is determined by counting the 
number of instances in which each buyer fails to huy at a price equal to or 
below his/her redemption value. Although the incidence ofwithholding, in the 
profit disclosure treatment, is far greater in the sales tax regime (23) than in the 
profit tax regime (4), 22 cases were in one experiment! Furthermore, that 
experiment yielded mean prices below that of two other experiments. This 
observed wi thholding was an uncontrolled 'treatmen t' variable. I t is importan t 
to note that the mean posted prices in that experiment were not higher than in 
the other experiments with sales tax. On the contrary, in all periods they were 
lower than in two other experiments and in the first period after the tax change 
they were the lowest of all. For the detailed price path see Fig. 3; the 
experiment in which the withholding occurred is sa4]J. It would appear that the 
tendency of sellers to post lower prices earlier but not later in the sequence of 
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tradíng periods \Vas the result either of seller • fairncss' behaviour or anticipation 
of strategic buyer withholding, nota response to buyer withholding. 
Withholding did not significantly affect efficiencics, maínly because often 
(though not always) onlymarginal uníts were withheld. However, there is one 
efficiency difference between our experiments and KLS. KLS state as one of 
theír hypotheses that 'Profit information will lead to lower volume and lower 
market efficiency than in either the cost-disdosure or no-disdosure markets' 
(KLS, p. 6g8) and report support for thís hypothesis. Our data do not support 
this hypothesis. In only two periods (6 and ro) is the average efficiency and the 
trading volume in the profit disclosure experiments the lowest of all treatments. 
Similarly, we observe lower efficiency and trading volume in the marginal cost 
disclosure treatment than do KLS. Minor differences are to be expected since 
the microstructure of the institutions (rules) of trade are different. But overaU 
the results reported by KLS are robust with respect to the change to posted~ 
offer pricing. 
!V. DISCUSSION 
Economists and econometricians have long allowed that nonmonetary and 
non-economic factors influence behaviour, although the standard rational 
model has always been more prominent. The exceptions are implicit in 
concepts of external economies in consumption. Recent work ( e.g. KKT) has 
shown how survey evidence can be used to study systematically, ancl categorise, 
a wide variety of behaviours that may deviate from the narrow interpretation 
of rational self~interested models of equilibrium behaviour. 
In this paper we ha ve studied the effect of alternative information disdosures 
on the prices posted by sellers subsequent to an exogenous increase in seller 
marginal costs (a sales tax). If, as argued by KKT, buyers are more receptive 
to price increases that appear to be cost justified than to price increases that 
increase profits above reference transaction levels, then, recognising this, sellers 
will post lower prices under profit dísclosure than under marginal cost 
disclosure. Over time, however, this discrepancy need not persist, since KKT 
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argue that actual (equilibrium) behaviour may allow the establishment of a 
new reference transaction that does not viola te social norms of fair behaviour. 
Our results support this argument. Consequently, the prediction is supported 
that equilibrium outcomes will reflect the rational behaviour of standard 
economic models, although the transition path to the new equilibrium is 
affected by such 'fairness' considerations. Our results also support the value of 
survey data in uncovering potential anomalies, which can then be tested in the 
context of motivated decisions to see if the findings survive in actual behaviour. 
According to the New York Times (Lohr, 1992), Hurricane Andrew, striking 
South Florida on 24 August 1992, provided a fine example ofhow the KKT 
'fairness' considerations are needed to modify econo-mic theory. 'What 
happened in the plywood market here after the storm is a classical example of 
fairness constraints at work ... The big companies (Home Depot, Georgia 
Pacific and Louisiana-Pacific) performed far differently (increasing the price 
only about half as much as the "market ") than the price-gougers selling ice, 
water and lumber from the back ofpickup trucks at wildly inflated prices in the 
first week after the hurricane hit. Classic economic theory, of course, defends 
these ... ' (Lohr, 1992, p. C2). Actually what classical theory does is to explain, 
not defend, the competitive market operated out of the back of pickup trucks. 
In a competitive market, those who would attempt to charge low prices would 
stock out more quickly, and thus are under pressure to raise prices, given the 
limited supplies; otherwise arbitrage profits will be collected by third parties. 
Modern economics, in the form of reputation theory, also explains the actions 
of the large firms who have much greater control over their market. Their 
national sources of supply enable them, through transfers, to replenish stocks 
m'ore quickly, price less aggressively, and build a long term reputation for not 
'price gouging' (with free advertising, courtesy ofthe New York Times article), 
but simultaneously reap supra normal profits (they did raise prices, if only half 
as muchas the competitive fringe). But one does not need a utilitarian fairness 
ethic to explain the repeated game (versus one-shot) nature of the long-run 
outlook of the large supplies. Similarly, optimisation theory predicts that if 
buyers believe that they can conserve their resources by complaining about 
price gouging being unfair, then they will do it. The long-term result (hidden 
from the average consumer) may actually build the market power ofthe large 
firms, reduce competition, and decrease welfare: all in the good name of 
'fairness'. Would a rose by any other name smell as sweet? 
V. WHAT IS FAIRNESS? 
The answer, we think, is likely to depend on the particular context in which the 
term is used. In the context that we study here the results are not consistent 
with the idea that 'fairness' considerations belong in the utility function, as an 
externality in consumption that alters in a sustainable way the equilibrium 
behaviour predicted by the standard own utility maximising model.6 
6 To illustrate, suppose that there are two commodities, X and Z, and that the utility function for each 
buyer has the form u(x,zi1T/1T0) = z+ax+ (b/2) x2-ax[(1T/1T0)- 1] with income constraint, I = z+px, where 
pis the price of X in units of Z. Note that, with the parameter a> o, an extemality (1T/1T0) appears in the 
10 
We suggest that 'fairness' in our context is best characterised as affecting 
agent expectations, not their utility functions. Thus, buyers expecting (feeling 
they ha ve a right to) fair treatment believe that price in creases resulting from 
externa! cost increases should not produce higher profits for sellers. Sellers, 
accepting this norm of fair treatment, or fearing retaliation, do not attempt 
initially to 'extract' higher profit. These expectations yield no change in prices, 
initially, but such prices are unsustainable asan equilibrium; i.e. there is excess 
demand. In the absence ofa utility from being 'fair' sellers gradually do what 
comes naturally: they raise prices and find rewards in higher profits. lf sellers 
received utilitarian value from 'fairness' they would be satisfied with lower 
profit by accepting the profit-fairness trade-off. If buyers received uÚlitarian 
value from 'fairness' their final equilibrium demand levels would not be 
predicted from the model that maximises their monetary reward. By this 
interpretation, what alters over time are the expectations of both buyers and 
sellers as to what is acceptable or 'fair'. This also explains why fairness 
dominates the questionnaire responses of subjects. Their answers are based 
upon their expectations, not on the unanticipated and unanticipatable 
adjustments that can occur in the dynamics of actual market or experimental 
market behaviour. This is because no one (except the experimenter in a market 
experiment) can anticípate the new equilibrium and its possible effect on 
transient expectations of what is fair. 7 
Also, questionnaire data summarise average, not marginal, opinion, and we 
know from hundreds of controlled laboratory experiments that competitive 
outcomes and efficiency are driven by marginal analysis (sometimes called the 
marginal traders hypothesis). Thus, in markets like the one in Fig. 1, average 
MV and average MC, are irrelevant to determining the equilibrium, where 
MV(Qe) ~ MC(Qe)· The marginal trader hypothesis explains why the lowa 
Presidential stock market is a much more accurate predictor of the popular 
utility function, where 7T0 is the profit of each seller in a reference (initial) situation, and 1T is the 
corresponding profit in a new situation. If búyers each maximise u subject to their income constraint, this 
leads to the demand equation:p = a-bx-a[(1T/1T0)- 1]. Ifeach seller has quadratic increasing total costs, 
the profit function (y = output) can be written, 1T = py- ( 1 j2jJ) y2, which at a maximum yields the supply 
function, y = flp. 
Initially, let a= a0, and 1T = 7T0• Then x0 =Yo (demand equals supply) implies p =Po= a0-bflp0 and 
Po= a0/(1 +bfl) ;7T0 = (jlj2)p~. Now let demand increase with a= a1 > a0 • Then x1 = y1 implies the new 
equilibrium, P = p¡ = a1-bflp1-a[(7T1/7T0)- 1], with (7T1/7T0) = PUP~· Clearly, if a> o, the extemality 
equilibrium, x1 = y1, is distinct from that which would prevail, where xt = yt, based on the absence of the 
externality (a= o). 
The price and quantity levels to which our experimental data converge over time correspond to the 
situation in this example in which a= o; i.e. the results in part 2 ofthe experimentare predicted from the 
standard own-maximising model of utility. 
1 Our expectations interpretation offairness is consistent with the results ofHoffman et al. (1993) in their 
ultimatum and dictator game experiments, although here the·results are stronger beca use there are six (not 
one) bargainers on each side of the market. Also see Binmore et al. (1992) who report Nash bargaining 
experiments in which the median subject optimises in the long run in accordance with the theory using trial-
and-error adjustment processes. 'However, the subjects seem to see no contradiction between such 
optimizing and "fair" behaviour, sin ce the median subject reports as fair pretty much what actually happens 
towards the end of the games he or she played. These results are consistent with a view that regards behaviour 
as being shaped by social norms in the minds ofthe subjects, but which sees the social norms themselves being 
determined by evolutionary considerations ofwhich the subjects are only dimly aware.' (Binmore et al. 1992, 
p. 34). This is consistent with KKT, and the adaptive results in the psychology literature, and with the results 
reported in this paper. 
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vote than opinion polls, although the participants prove to have, on average, 
all the standard opinion biases established by political science and sociological 
studies (Forsythe et al. 1992). 
Fehr et al. (1993) provide a different context in which the word 'fairness' is 
associated with deviations from self-interested behaviour. First movers (buyers) 
compete by announcing buying prices (anonymously by telephone through an 
experimenter) to sellers who can accept but not make counter offers. Sellers 
then choose a 'quality' or effort level for the good they produce; given any 
accepted price it is in the sellers' interest to choose low effort, but in the 
buyerfseller joint interest to choose high. Buyers do best individually with a low 
price, if sellers choose high effort, but the dominant strategy of sellers is to 
choose low. Cooperative play requires buyers to huy ata high price and to trust 
sellers to reciprocate with a high effort. In this two-stage market game the gains 
from exchange are maximised by cooperative ('fair') behaviour not by 
competitive action in the self interest. The market study reported here is the 
opposite: the gains from exchange are maximised by competition, and reduced 
by 'fair' behaviour (unless there is utilitarian compensation from 'fairness'). 
The Fehr et al. (1993) experimental data across pairs and periods shows a 
statistically and economically signifkant positive relationship between price 
and quality. The results are especially interesting since the pairings by the 
market are not constant through time so that reciprocity is diffuse. 
1 t is not clear, however, in what sense these results are 'explained' by a 
( utilitarian ?) 'fairness' ethic, as against a mutual expectation/recognition by 
all parties that individual rewards will deteriorate across time if there is not 
reciprocity: better quality for better prices, for better quality, etc. Parallel 
r~sults ha ve been reported by Berg et al. ( 1994) in the single play of a two-stage 
dictator game run urider double blind conditions (see Hoffman et al. 1993: 
subjects' pairings are anonymous with respect to each other and the 
experimenter, who cannot know who made what decision). In Stage 1, subjects 
in room A choose how much oftheir $10 endowment to send toan anonymous 
counterpart in room B. Each dollar sent will be tripled (common knowledge) 
before it reaches the counterpart, who, in Stage 11, chooses how much of this 
tripled amount to pay back to the person in room B. The dominant strategy for 
subjects in room A is to keep all the money, because it is a dominant strategy 
for any money received in room B to be retained. The average amount sent is 
$5.16 with an average payback of$4.66. In a second 'social norm' treatment 
all subjects are given a common history: the outcomes from all plays in the first 
treatment. The average sent is now $5.36 with a payback of $6.46. 
Berg et al. (1994) do not suggest that their results are dueto 'fairness'. As 
they describe it, they are studying trust and reciprocity. Subjects in room A can 
substantially leverage their endowments by 'investment' in amounts sent to 
room B. But this requires trust and an expectation of reciprocity. They are 
studying mechanisms ofsocial exchange, and how the social norms that support 
such exchange can emerge from historical experience. These mechanisms allow 
gains from exchange to be captured in situations where traditional economic 
analysis would suggest market failure. Such mechanisms are metarational, and 
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materially extend the rational choice paradigm to include the evolution of 
institutions that promote gains from exchange in situatíons that are not 
incentive compatible. 
We think the results of our paper and those ofFehr et al. (1993), and ofBerg 
et al. (1994), contribute toa unified understanding of anomalous behaviour 
usually attributed to 'fairness'. Although the contexts differ in the three 
studies, the anomalous results are not explained satisfactorily by a utilitarian 
fairness ethic) but by expectations that are not sustainable, in our study, or by 
trust coupled with expectations of reciprocity, in the other t:\·'lO studies, The 
common outcome across the three studies is for subjects to approach the 
efficient maximisation of the social monetary gains from exchange. 
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